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privatised firms  
 
Abstract  
This paper assesses China’s integration with the global stock market over its privatisation 
process, by examining the asset pricing mechanisms of Chinese firms under different levels 
of state ownership within a two-beta CAPM framework. We derive time-varying national and 
global systematic risks for the portfolios compiled on the basis of residual state ownership 
and examine how these risks are priced while controlling for structural changes exogenously 
and endogenously. Through anchoring our analysis to the portfolios capturing this 
institutional factor, we observe mostly positive pricing of the systematic risks, instead of the 
negative pricing often found in the literature on emerging markets. Within this well-
controlled framework, some interesting points emerge. While full privatisation does not 
eliminate exposure to the national systematic risk, more heavily privatised firms (i.e., those 
with the least residual state ownership) tend to price only the global risk more often than less 
privatised ones. Hence, among partly-privatised firms, integration with the global market 
strengthens as state ownership decreases. These results suggest that emerging economies 
pursue rigorous privatisation and yet governments keep small stakes in privatised firms in 
order to ensure integration with the global market.  
JEL classification: C32, F36, G12, G15 
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1. Introduction 
Emerging economies around the world pursue privatisation for the benefits of improved 
efficiency, reduction of public debt and/or better access to equity capital. However, inflow of 
portfolio investments depends on whether the emerging stock markets are integrated with the 
global market. Although integrated stock markets may be more volatile, funds for these 
markets are more readily available at lower costs. It is of interest to examine whether 
emerging stock markets could be more integrated with the global market if political 
authorities were less significantly involved in firm governance. This paper, therefore, 
attempts to control for residual state ownership in the assessment of China’s integration with 
the global stock market within an augmented CAPM framework in the style of Jorion and 
Schwartz (1986). As China has many of the typical characteristics of emerging markets, the 
study of the role of residual state ownership in stock market integration will produce useful 
policy implications for emerging economies.  
Within the chosen asset-pricing framework, stock market integration is defined as a situation 
where investors earn the same risk-adjusted expected return on similar portfolios in local and 
global markets. Hence, the investigation of market integration for a particular economy, in 
principle, involves testing whether systematic risk relative to the global market is the only 
significant factor in an asset pricing model, when both global and national systematic risks 
are controlled for. This definition of stock market integration is in stark contrast to the less 
theoretically based statistical interdependence that is widely used in the existing literature on 
integration between national stock markets. However, many studies in the context of asset 
pricing (e.g., Mo and Wu, 2007; Omran, 2007 and Li, 2013) commonly find negative risk 
pricing, especially the pricing of the national systematic risk, for emerging markets. Negative 
risk pricing is inconsistent with the theory of risk aversion and suggests that investors will not 
be compensated for taking on risky investment projects. Haugen (1999) attributes the 
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negative trade-off between return and risk to the omission of a size or liquidity premium 
effect in the CAPM model. It is also possible that the negative risk pricing in emerging 
markets is due to the omission of the risk of political interference, given that Diamonte et al. 
(1996), Erb et al. (1996) and Bekaert et al. (1997) find that in most emerging markets, 
political risk is a priced factor for which investors are rewarded.  
We accept that these potentially omitted risk factors might not be diversified away as 
assumed by the modern portfolio theory, so in this paper, we will take these factors into 
account when assessing stock market integration within the well-developed two-beta CAPM 
framework. However, we will not simply add these risk factors to the two-beta asset-pricing 
model that is already based on a sound theoretical definition of stock market integration. Our 
practice is based on econometric considerations. If we do not know any ‘true’ model 
alternative to this two-beta asset-pricing model, adding more factors to the existing model 
will not help unless we could exhaust the list of omitted variables that need to be considered. 
There are also practical difficulties to proxy properly or quantify these omitted risk factors 
for empirical studies. For example, political risk is typically measured by ratings that relate to 
restrictions on the repatriation of profits, exchange control or the risk of expropriation and 
contract repudiation by governments. These national ratings cannot be applied to studies of 
asset pricing at the firm level within countries. Another example is liquidity risk. Liquidity 
refers to the degree to which assets can be liquidated over a short period of time at minimal 
cost with minimum price impact. Although a multitude of liquidity proxies can be found in 
the literature, Bernstein (1987) argues that no single measure tells the whole story of 
liquidity. Instead we will control for these factors by anchoring our analysis to portfolios, 
whose constituent stocks are selected in such a way that they have similar levels of these 
omitted risks within portfolios and distinct levels of the risks between portfolios.  
5	  
	  
Residual state ownership is a major institutional characteristic of emerging economies and it 
is likely to be associated with potential risks omitted from the two-beta CAPM framework as 
documented in the section of review of the literature. Hence, in this paper, we will use the 
extent of residual state ownership as the criterion to compile portfolios in order to control for 
risks of political interference and liquidity. Specifically, we compile portfolios to represent 
the firms that have been privatised to different degrees, e.g., the firms falling in the bottom, 
middle and upper quartiles of the state ownership distribution during January 2000 to 
December 2011. The constituent stocks of the portfolios are permitted to change over time, 
i.e., to leave or join a portfolio according to their percentage of state-owned shares each year, 
ensuring that the stocks within portfolios have similar levels of potential risks over time. For 
comparison purposes, we also generate portfolios of shares, respectively, from firms that 
have never been owned by the state and firms that have been fully privatised. For all 
portfolios, we weigh their constituent stocks with their market capitalisation, further 
controlling for heterogeneity in market activity and size within portfolios. Selecting 
portfolios representing firms under different levels of state ownership as the anchor of our 
analysis has therefore both empirical and economic appeal. With similar strategic importance, 
shares within such portfolios have similar liquidity risk and political risk, ensuring fair tests 
of their exposures to the global and national systematic risks across portfolios within the two-
beta CAPM framework. By contrasting the test results between portfolios, we can observe 
whether residual state ownership hinders stock market integration additionally. 
The empirical work in this paper will entail firstly the derivation of time-invariant and time-
varying global and national systematic risks for these portfolios using OLS and Kalman 
smoothing techniques respectively and secondly the examination of how the national and 
global systematic risks are priced by these portfolios in a time-varying setting. We will 
ensure that structural changes in the sample period are controlled for exogenously through a 
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dummy variable approach and endogenously by the Markov regime-switching technique 
respectively. Compared with the conventional two-pass or simultaneous time-series cross-
section regression analysis in the literature, these statistical techniques will help address the 
concerns of financial economists that the behaviour of beta risks is not constant over time and 
that risk prices can be altered by policy changes or crises.  
We contribute to the literature in several important ways. Firstly, we propose to take into 
account the institutional factor of state ownership when testing for stock market integration 
between emerging economies and the global market. We successfully incorporate potential 
risks, such as liquidity and political interference, into the two-beta CAPM framework by 
anchoring our analysis to the unique portfolios that represent different levels of state 
ownership of an emerging market like China. Although many studies have been carried out 
on the influence of China’s state ownership on corporate operating performance (see Fan et 
al., 2014), to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to explore whether residual state 
ownership alters firms’ exposures to the national and global systematic risks. As we aim to 
detect changes in the degree of China’s integration with the global market over its 
privatisation process, our work is also different from Wang and Di Iorio (2007) and Li (2013) 
who study China’s stock market integration in relation to whether foreign investors are 
restricted or not. Lastly, we stratify the whole sample to enable the contrast of the asset 
pricing mechanisms between fully- and partly-privatised firms as well as among the partly-
privatised firms and deduce a non-linear relationship, which is missing in the literature but 
needed for policy making, between ownership structure and stock market integration. Our 
findings about this relationship will enable emerging economies to design a privatisation 
programme that is most likely to result in integration with the global market and reap the 
benefits associated with integration, such as lower cost of capital and greater investment 
funds.   
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We review the literature in section 2 and 
describe the empirical framework in section 3. We generate the unique portfolios and carry 
out the preliminary data analysis in section 4.  Estimation and tests are implemented in 
section 5 and finally, in section 6 we provide our conclusions. 
2. Review of the literature 
Most studies on stock market integration are conducted through cointegration or correlation 
analysis of market indices or returns. However the existence of a long-run relationship or 
correlation between national markets does not prove stock market integration. Recently, a 
number of studies on China’s stock market integration have been carried out in the context of 
asset-pricing models. Following Jorion and Schwartz (1986), Wang and Di Iorio (2007) and 
Li (2013) have tested for China’s stock market integration within the framework of an 
augmented CAPM. While Wang and Di Iorio (2008) do not find any evidence of integration, 
Li (2013) finds that China’s once-restricted A-share market tends to be more integrated with 
the global market than the unrestricted B-share market. Commonly, these studies have 
overlooked the ownership structure of Chinese firms. Although privatisation is deepening, 
most of the Chinese firms are still partly owned by the government, which holds the power to 
interfere.  
2.1 Firm characteristics and state ownership in China 
Over the years, China has introduced various reforms gradually. As usual, China implements 
its ‘share issue privatisation’1 in stages. In the late 1990s, wishing to compete with foreign 
rivals, the government only sold off small-sized state-owned firms and kept in state hands 
firms with a critical economic mass comparable with the Japanese keiretsu or the Korean 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “Share	  issue	  privatisation’	  adopted	  by	  China	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  gradual	  approach,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  more	  
radical	  ‘asset	  privatization’	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  Eastern	  European	  economies.	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chaebol. As privatization deepens, the authorities still maintain their major presence and 
controlling stakes in strategic and pillar industries, such as chemical, steel, utilities and 
transport equipment. These strategic industries have high state ownership and are big in size. 
Wei and Varela (2003) and Ng et al. (2009) confirm that firm size is one of the main 
determinants of China’s state ownership and the state exerts control over large firms for 
employment and social welfare reasons. As argued by Bolton and von Thadden (1998) and 
Brounen et al. (2009) that high concentration of share ownership by nonretail investors, such 
as blockholders, company insiders and institutional investors, reduces the liquidity of a stock, 
the shares owned by the Chinese government are illiquid. Before the non-tradable share 
reform in 2005, state-owned shares were prohibited from being traded in the market. Even 
though all shares have become tradable since the reform, the state has hardly sold off its 
stakes in a large scale in the firms of strategic importance, making no significant difference to 
the liquidity of shares in state hands. It appears that firm characteristics such as size, 
concentration of ownership and liquidity are related to residual state ownership in China.  
2.2 Non-linear relationship between residual state ownership and political interference 
The literature has established a relationship between privatisation and political interference, 
but the sign of the relationship depends on whether we chart it across fully- and partly- 
privatised firms or among partly privatised firms. Perotti (1995) suggests that fully-privatised 
firms face higher political risk than partly-privatised firms. He shows theoretically that 
residual state ownership in a privatised firm can serve as a commitment device to mitigate 
political risk. With incomplete information about government’s preferences, investors treat 
the stakes a government keeps in partly-privatised firms as a credible signal of its willingness 
not to interfere in the running of the businesses. Fully-privatised firms, on the other hand, are 
left prone to exposure to the risk of political interference. Hence, fully-privatised firms 
should be more risky than firms where governments keep residual stakes, and as such they 
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should yield higher expected returns. Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) find evidence that partly-
privatised firms are more valuable than fully-privatised ones, but there is no empirical 
evidence to support Perotti (1995) that fully-privatised firms are more risky than partly-
privatised ones. On the other hand, the empirical literature on the development of emerging 
stock markets suggests a negative correlation between the risk of political interference and 
the progress of privatisation programmes in developing countries. That is, among partly-
privatised firms, political risk decreases as privatisation deepens. Perotti and van Oijen 
(2001) suggests that the actual implementation of privatisation programmes contributes to 
building investor confidence about political commitment to market-oriented reforms, hence 
progress in privatisation is positively correlated with improvements in perceived political 
risk. Bekaert and Harvey (2003) explain that successful privatisation of politically sensitive 
industries may convince investors to reduce the ex-ante perceived risk of government 
interference in investment decisions and expropriation of productive assets. Hence, among 
partly-privatised firms, it is expected that political interference decreases as privatisation 
deepens.  
In their study on stock price informativeness, Ben-Nasr and Cosset (2014) find that stock 
price informativeness decreases under state ownership and suggest that higher state 
ownership is associated with higher post-privatisation political interference, and hence with 
lower transparency and lower firm-level stock price variation. Their result is robust across a 
variety of measures of state ownership, from percentage of state ownership to ultimate state 
ownership (i.e., states having at least 10% voting rights of privatised firms) or state 
ownership with control (i.e., governments owning more than 50% of the shares of privatised 
firms). The authors distinguish between the cases of control and revenue privatisation 
through the threshold of 50% state ownership. When it retains more than 50% of the shares of 
a privatised firm, the government intends to be involved in corporate decision-making rather 
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than simply generate revenues through privatisation. The literature on the relationship 
between privatisation and corporate performance is also informative for our study. Ng et al. 
(2009) confirm that this relationship in China appears to be convex, suggesting benefits from 
either heavy privatisation or strong state control. While private owners are better motivated to 
monitor, discipline and reward their managers to improve firm performance, Ng et al. (2009) 
consider that government political support and business connections provided through state 
ownership are valuable and necessary too.  
All these theoretical arguments and empirical evidence motivate us to control for political 
interference using residual state ownership in the assessment of stock market integration. 
Following the literature, we will deal with the non-linearity by stratifying the sample and 
interpreting our results in two separate contexts, between fully and partly privatised firms and 
among partly privatised firms. We have not seen much work on the relationship between 
residual state ownership and beta risk pricing or between level of political interference and 
degree of stock market integration. The most relevant study is Bekaert (1995), which finds 
that global factors account for a small fraction of expected returns in most markets and the 
emerging markets exhibit different degrees of integration with the US market. The most 
important de facto barriers to market integration are country-specific risk factors. On the 
basis of the literature and taking into account the ownership structure of the Chinese stocks, 
we hypothesise that decreasing state ownership will reduce investors’ exposure to the 
national risk factor, hence the barriers to stock market integration. Validation of this 
hypothesis will encourage emerging markets to pursue a vigorous privatisation programme in 
order to reap the benefits of stock market integration.       
3. Empirical framework and methodology 
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This empirical study is carried out within the theoretical framework of Jorion and Schwartz 
(1986) using the procedure developed by Li (2013). Jorion and Schwartz (1986) propose to 
augment the international CAPM with an orthogonal national excess return or the domestic 
CAPM with an orthogonal global excess return and derive the following test equations. 
                                     (1)    
and  
                                    (1’) 
where R is the excess return of a portfolio. For each portfolio, βG and βN are systematic risks 
relative to the global and national market returns, RG and RN, respectively. They are also 
known as the unorthogonal systematic risks, as opposed to the terms,	  β
N−G and βG−N , that 
are orthogonal systematic risks and represent systematic risks relative to the independent 
national and global markets. Empirical counterparts to these independent market returns, ωN-G 
and ωG-N, are constructed by a least squares decomposition of an OLS regression of the 
national (/global) market return upon the global (/national) return.  
We follow Li (2013) and modify Eq. (1) as follows to permit time-varying systematic risks, 
in line with the considerable literature that beta risks are not constant over time.  
 
That is, we use µ to represent the intercept of Eq. (1) and allow the parameters, µ, βG and βN-
G, to vary over time by following independent random walks. Although it seems simplistic to 
generate the time-varying coefficients via the random walk models, the random walk 
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approach avoids the mis-specification error that disadvantages the alternative approach, the 
instrumental variable approach. Eqs. (2.1) to (2.3), therefore, constitute the transition 
equations of a state space model with Eq. (2) being the measurement equation. Similarly, a 
set of transition equations, Eqs. (2.1’) to (2.3’), and a measurement equation, Eq. (2’), can be 
derived for Eq. (1’). The Kalman smoothing technique can then be used to estimate the time-
varying parameters in these two state space models.  
The restrictions, µt = γ0 (1−βtG )+γ2βtN−G  and µt = δ0 (1−βtN )+δ2βtG−N , are now testable 
implications of the asset pricing theory that underpins Eqs. (1) and (1’). That is, we can test 
for integration versus segmentation, respectively, in the following two-factor asset pricing 
models:  
µt
G = γ0 (1−βtG )+γ2βtN−G +ξtG                                                                                          (3) 
and 
µt
N = δ0 (1−βtN )+δ2βtG−N +ξtN                                                                                         (3’)        
If  in Eq. (3), the global systematic risk is the only influencing factor in asset pricing, 
favouring the hypothesis of integration with the global market. When  in Eq. (3’), the 
national systematic risk is the only determinant of asset pricing, supporting the hypothesis of 
segmentation. In the context of the Chinese stock market, we expect that  holds most 
likely in the portfolio of the firms that have been privatised to the highest extent or have been 
fully privatised. On the other hand, we do not expect that δ2 = 0  holds in the Chinese stock 
market due to its strong trade links with the rest of the world. The rejection of  and 
δ2 = 0 in favour of γ2 > 0  and δ2 > 0  will expose the portfolios to both the global and national 
systematic risks, providing evidence of partial integration with the global market. 
02 =γ
02 =δ
02 =γ
02 =γ
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Since China experienced various reforms and changes during the sample period, we will use 
the Bai-Perron algorithm (2003) to detect structural changes in the relationships in Eqs. (3) 
and (3’). Once the break points are identified, we will introduce m indicators, Dit, taking a 
value of unity since the break point t and zero otherwise, in Eqs. (3) and (3’) as follows: 
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where m is the number of break points that are common to all or the majority of the portfolios 
under the principle of parsimony. The inclusion of the break points can be justified by the 
Wald tests of 0=jic γ  or 0=jic δ  with i = 1, … and m and j = 0 (for the unorthogonal 
systematic risks) and 2 (for the orthogonal systematic risks). The changes in portfolios’ asset 
pricing mechanisms can be examined by individually testing for hypotheses relating to the 
coefficients of the interaction terms, ciγ j  and ciδ j . A hypothesis of integration since and/or up 
to break i is represented by γ2 + ciγ 2
i=1
m
∑ = 0  in Eq. (4), whilst the segmentation hypothesis is 
0
1
22 =+∑
=
m
i
ic δδ  in Eq. (4’).  
As an alternative, we will estimate Eqs. (3) and (3’) parsimoniously by controlling for all 
structural changes endogenously using the Markov two-state regime-switching approach. 
This approach allows a hypothetical regularity in stock market behaviour by categorising the 
changes into two groups, one resulting in high volatility and the other low volatility, as 
follows.   
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µt
G = γ0,st (1−βtG )+γ2,stβtN−G +ξtG                                                                     (5)  
and 
µt
N = δ0,st (1−βtN )+δ2,stβtG−N +ξtN                                                                    (5’) 
where and  with . As usual, the parameters in the system 
will be estimated simultaneously using a maximum likelihood approach. We will further 
generate{p1t} , the probability for regime 1 being in force at each point in time, using the 
following recursive representation of Gray (1996). 
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where P = Pr(St =1 St−1 =1)  and Q = Pr(St = 2 St−1 = 2)  are the probabilities to stay in regimes 
1 and 2 at time t, respectively, and g1t-1=f(µt-1|St-1=1) and g2t-1=f(µt-1|St-1=2) are the likelihood 
of being in regime j at time t-1 conditional on being in state j and information of time t-1. We 
can plot tp  against time for each portfolio and contrast between the regime-switching points 
identified by the recursive representation of Gray (1996) and the structural breaks identified 
by the Bai-Perron algorithm (2003).  
4. Portfolio compilation and preliminary analysis 
Data for this study are monthly time series from January 2000 until December 2011, 
representing possibly the longest period with the biggest sample size of firms in which the 
government keeps stakes. We retrieve data on the number of total shares and the number of 
state-owned shares for 2663 firms during 2000-2011 from the website of Chinese Security 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR). Among these 2663 firms, 54 firms have zero 
state ownership throughout the sample period and 408 firms have been fully privatised in the 
2)var(
tGs
G
t σξ =
2)var(
tNs
N
t σξ = ]2,1[∈ts
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period under study and remained privately owned until at least 2014. In the remaining firms, 
by removing firms that have missing state ownership data or have zero state ownership in any 
year from 2000 to 2011, we retain 182 firms that have a complete series of non-zero state 
ownership during 2000-2011. We calculate percentages of state ownership for these 182 
firms and sort these firms by their percentages of state ownership from the smallest to the 
largest each year. We then stratify the sample and calculate yearly average percentages of 
state ownership for the bottom, middle and top 25% of the firms in the state ownership 
distribution over the sample period of 2000 - 20112. 
Figure 1 plots the average percentages of state ownership for the bottom (decreasing from 
17.65% to 2.33% over time), middle (47.6% to 24.1%) and upper (69.8% to 59.3%) quartiles 
during 2000-2011. The government is expected to have control rights in the firms falling in 
the upper quartile of the distribution. It is observed that the average percentages of residual 
state ownership decrease, albeit less sharply in the upper quartile, over time. The major 
turning point appears to be in 2005 when China started the non-tradable share reform. These 
features are consistent with the Chinese government’s aims of reforming the ownership 
structure of stated-owned enterprises: maintaining its controlling stakes in the strategic and 
pillar industries, while permitting competition in non-strategic industries of consumer goods 
or services.  
[Figure 1 is about here.] 
We then retrieve from CSMAR the monthly closing share prices and market values for the 54 
firms that have never been owned by the state, 408 firms that have been fully privatised and 
182 firms that are still partly owned by the state during the period of December 1999-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Given the relatively small sample size, we use quartiles instead of quintiles to ensure sufficient data points in	  
each group and the middle 25% of the distribution to distinguish the average state ownership from those in the 
bottom and upper quartiles. 
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December 2011. The series of the closing prices and market values are complete for the 54 
firms that have never been owned by the state. However, only 198 out of the 408 fully-
privatised firms have the complete series of closing prices and market values. Some of the 
182 partly-privatised firms do not have complete series of closing prices either. Omitting the 
firms with missing data, we manage to retain at least 33 and up to 45 stocks in the bottom 
quartile of the state ownership distribution, and 36 to 45 stocks in both the middle and upper 
quartiles during the period. We then calculate the monthly market value-weighted average 
prices for the five portfolios, namely the shares of the firms that have never been owned by 
the state (denoted by ZERO thereafter), the shares of the firms that have been fully privatised 
(FULPRI), and the shares of the firms whose residual state ownership fall, respectively, in the 
bottom (BOTQUAR), middle (MIDQUAR) and upper (UPPQUAR) quartiles of the 
distribution from January 2000 to December 2011. Figure 2 plots the market value-weighted 
average prices of the portfolios of ZERO, FULPRI and MIDQUAR during 2000-2011. It is 
noted that the average prices of the three portfolios moved together before 2009. These 
average stock prices continued to increase through 2007 even when the global financial crisis 
started. These average stock prices did not start to fall until the beginning of 2008. By the end 
of 2008 the average prices have only fallen to the lowest level of 2007. Since 2009, the 
average prices of these portfolios have started to diverge, with the average share price of the 
firms with a medium level of residual state ownership becoming the highest in 2010 and 
2011.  
[Figure 2 is about here.] 
The variable of interest in this study is the excess returns of the five portfolios. We generate 
the excess returns as follows. We convert the market value-weighted average prices of the 
five portfolios in Chinese Yuan to those in the US dollar, using the monthly exchange rates 
retrieved from the Federal Reserve website. We then calculate realised returns for the five 
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portfolios by taking the first differences of natural logarithm of these average prices during 
December 1999 - December 2011. The excess returns are the differences between the realised 
returns and the risk-free rates obtained from CSMAR. We use the Chinese A-share market 
index in the US dollar compiled by Datastream to represent the Chinese national market 
portfolio, as this index covers the vast majority of stock listings on the stock exchanges in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen. The excess return of the national market is hence the difference 
between the realised return of the national market and the risk-free rate from the CSMAR 
website. The global market portfolio is represented by the MSCI world all country index and 
its risk-free rate is from Kenneth French’s website3. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for 
the excess returns of the five portfolios in contrast with those of the national and the global 
stock markets.   
[Table 1 is about here.] 
Table 1 shows that all portfolios, including the national and global market portfolios, have 
performed poorly in the sample period. Given the stronger rate of return on the Chinese risk-
free investment, the Chinese portfolios may not have performed much worse than the global 
market portfolio. As expected, volatility, as measured by standard deviations, of the Chinese 
excess returns is greater than that of the global excess return. Within the Chinese portfolios, 
the excess return of FULPRI is the least volatile. Among the three portfolios of the partly-
privatised firms, however, volatility decreases as state control increases. The statistics 
support our effort to distinguish between part- and full-privatisation when asserting a 
relationship between total risk and residual state ownership.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Sensitivities to the national and global factors  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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We first estimate the constant-coefficient version of Eqs. (2) and (2’) by OLS to derive the 
benchmark time-invariant unorthogonal and orthogonal systematic risks: βG, βN-G, βN and βG-N 
for the five portfolios under study. For all portfolios, as reported in Table 2, both the 
unorthognoal and orthogonal national systematic risks, βN and βN-G, are individually 
statistically significant and their global counterparts, βG and βG-N, are not, suggesting that the 
excess returns of the Chinese portfolios are only sensitive to the excess return of the national 
market. Moreover, according to the Wald tests4 on the coefficients, the unorthogonal and 
orthogonal national systematic risks are not statistically different from each other within 
portfolios. Between portfolios, the Chinese stocks are equally sensitive to the national factor, 
as the magnitudes of the national systematic risks, βN and βN-G, are respectively confirmed by 
the Wald tests not to be statistically different from one another. It seems that time-invariant 
sensitivities to the national and global systematic risks are, respectively, homogenous across 
portfolios.  
[Table 2 is about here.] 
We then estimate Eqs. (2) and (2’) using the Kalman smoothing algorithm to obtain time-
varying unorthogonal and orthogonal systematic risks. We remove the first eighteen 
estimates from the resulting series to avoid the instability and extreme values that are typical 
in the initialisation period of the smoothing algorithm and plot them against time in Figure 3. 
These figures show that all of the national and global systematic risks vary over time and that 
the national systematic risks, either unorthogonal or orthogonal, are greater than their global 
counterparts in all cases. The orthogonal national systematic risks in Panel A of Figure 3 
appear to be equal in magnitude to their unorthogonal counterparts in Panel B, similar to the 
results of the Wald tests on the equality of the time-invariant coefficients in Eqs. (2) and (2’). 
However, even the orthogonal global systematic risks in Panel B are not uniformly zero as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  Wald	  test	  results	  about	  coefficients	  here	  and	  thereafter	  are	  available	  on	  request.	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suggested by the constant-beta approach. An upward trend can be observed in the orthogonal 
global systematic risks for most of the portfolios during 2004 and 2008. In the case of 
FULPRI, the orthogonal global systematic risk started to rise in 2004 at the earliest and the 
magnitude of the time-varying orthogonal global systematic risk was the highest, possibly 
suggesting that the shares of the fully-privatised firms are the most sensitive to the global 
factor.  
Overall, according to the exploratory analyses, the domestic factor is always relevant to the 
pricing of the Chinese securities regardless of their extent of privatisation, while the global 
factor becomes relevant, especially for the determination of the return of the shares of fully-
privatised firms, in the latter part of the period under study. We expect that the disparity in 
the sensitivities of the portfolios to the excess returns of the national and global markets will 
result in different risk pricing of the fully- and partly-privatised firms. 
 [Figure 3 is about here.] 
5.2. Risk prices in relation to residual state ownership  
In order to formally examine asset-pricing mechanism in relation to residual state ownership, 
we firstly substitute the time-varying coefficients of Eqs. (2) and (2’) to Eqs. (3) and (3’) and 
estimate the benchmark prices of the global and national systematic risks for the Chinese 
portfolios during July 2001 and December 2011. The results are reported in Table 3. 
Although they are not sensitive or are less sensitive to the global excess return in Eqs. (2) and 
(2’) in the previous section, all the Chinese portfolios expose positively to both unorthogonal5 
and orthogonal global systematic risks in Eqs. (3) and (3’). The positive pricing of the 
orthogonal global systematic risks in Eq. (3’) supports our expectation that the hypothesis of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The coefficients of (1−βtG ) and (1−βtN ) , γ0 and δ0, must be negative in order for the unorthogonal global 
and national systematic risks to be positively priced respectively. 	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segmentation is rejected in the Chinese stock market due to its strong trade links with the rest 
of the world. Three of the five portfolios, namely FULPRI, MIDQUAR and UPPQUAR, 
further reject the null hypothesis of integration in favour of positive exposure to the 
orthogonal national systematic risk in Eq. (3). These three portfolios, therefore, expose to 
both the global and national systematic risks and they consistently price the orthogonal global 
systematic risk more than the orthogonal national systematic risk. The Wald tests on the 
coefficients of the orthogonal global and national systematic risks in Eqs. (3) and (3’) 
confirm that the two-beta CAPM is preferred to a pure domestic CAPM in these cases. Given 
that the results of the panel’s fixed-effect model in Eq. (3) also suggest that both the global 
and national systematic risks are statistically significant in determining the returns of the 
Chinese portfolios, we conclude that the Chinese stock market is mainly partially integrated 
with the global market.  
Although partial integration is evident in the portfolios of FULPRI, MIDQUAR and 
UPPQUAR, risk pricing by BOTQUAR and ZERO suggests the alternatives of partial 
integration respectively. In the case of BOTQUAR, the null hypothesis of integration cannot 
be rejected, while the null hypothesis of segmentation is rejected, leaving the global 
systematic risk as the only factor in influencing BOTQUAR’s asset pricing. Hence 
BOTQUAR meets the condition of complete integration with the global market. Although the 
null hypothesis of integration is rejected, ZERO exposes negatively to the orthogonal national 
systematic risk, suggesting that the investors in the firms that have never been owned by the 
state discount the national risk in the sample period.  
[Table 3 is about here.] 
However, as reported by Table 4, using the Bai-Perron algorithm (Bai and Perron, 2003), we 
detect a range of 2 to 4 structural breaks, suggesting 3 to 5 regimes over time, in the 
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relationships of Eqs. (3) and (3’) across the five portfolios under study. Table 4 further 
reports that the breaks have occurred at different time points between Eqs. (3) and (3’) even 
within portfolios. Because the location and number of the change points are not uniform 
within or between portfolios, we do not attempt to partition the sample period or estimate 
Eqs. (3) and (3’) for the multiple non-matching sub-periods. Instead, we will estimate them 
parsimoniously, in order to obtain results general to the portfolios, by controlling for the most 
common breaks exogenously using a dummy variable approach as in Eqs. (4) and (4’) or 
controlling for all breaks endogenously using the Markov regime-switching technique as in 
Eqs. (5) and (5’). 
[Table 4 is about here.] 
5.2.1. when structural changes are exogenously controlled for  
It is noted in Table 4 that all the portfolios experience a structural break at May 2004, around 
the time when the Chinese authorities implemented various measures to improve corporate 
governance of the listed companies. This is confirmed by the observation in Figure 3 that the 
global and national systematic risks have started to rise more or less since May 2004. Since 
the break point at May 2004, China has also implemented the non-tradable share reform. It is 
claimed that most of the non-tradable shares have become tradable by the end of 2007. The 
second most common breaks, July 2008 for FULPRI and UPPQUAR and February 2009 for 
ZERO, BOTQUAR and MIDQUAR, correspond to the period when the global systematic 
risks fluctuate greatly in Figure 3. Note that July 2008 falls towards the latter part of the 
recent global financial crisis during August 2007 and March 2009, while February 2009 is 
very close to the end of the crisis. These two breaks capture the Chinese situations at the time 
well: the Chinese economy did not suffer from any major adverse effect of the global 
financial crisis until the crisis began to push the US and Europe into recession, reducing their 
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imports from the emerging economies including China. Hence these second most common 
break points signal the start of a sub-period of economic recession in the world. In this 
section, we control for the most common breaks at May 2004 and February 2009, when 
estimating Eqs. (4) and (4’) by a panel data regression. When estimating Eqs. (4) and (4’) 
individually for the portfolios, we control for the two breaks, May 2004 and July 2008 or 
February 2009, as identified by the Bai-Perron algorithm. The results are reported in Table 5. 
Note that the inclusion of the two break points is justified in all cases by the Wald tests of the 
null hypotheses of ciγ j = 0  and ciδ j = 0  with i=1 and 2 and j=0 and 2.  
[Table 5 is about here.] 
The estimates of the panel’s fixed-effects model in Table 5 seem to support our conclusion in 
section 5.2 that the Chinese market is mainly partially integrated with the global market. The 
null hypotheses of integration and segmentation can be rejected, respectively, in favour of 
positive exposures to the orthogonal national and global systematic risks (γ2 > 0 and δ2 > 0)  
in the sub-period from July 2001 to April 2004. Since the break point of May 2004, the 
exposure to the orthogonal national systematic risk has increased and the exposure to the 
orthogonal global systematic risk has decreased. While that of the orthogonal global 
systematic risk is slightly lower, the price of the orthogonal national systematic risk is 
confirmed by the Wald test to be greater in the sub-period from May 2004 to January 2009 
than the sub-period pre-May 2004. Moreover, the null hypotheses of integration and 
segmentation are still respectively rejected in favour of their alternatives (γ2 + c1γ 2 > 0  and 
δ2 + c1δ2 > 0) , suggesting that the Chinese portfolios expose to both the national and global 
systematic risks during May 2004 and January 2009. In the subsequent sub-period following 
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the break point of February 2009, the exposures to the unorthogonal6 and orthogonal national 
and global systematic risks have decreased. The decreases in the exposures to the orthogonal 
systematic risks have led to negative pricing of both the orthogonal national and global 
systematic risks (γ2 + c1γ 2 + c2γ 2 < 0  and δ2 + c1δ2 + c2δ2 < 0) . It seems that the investors in the 
Chinese stock market are unwilling to pay any premium to hedge against national or global 
downturns during February 2009 and December 2011, when the world economy went into 
recession.  
The results of Eqs. (4) and (4’) for the individual portfolios reveal diverse risk pricing across 
portfolios and over time. In the period up to April 2004, the firms that have never been 
owned by the state (ZERO) positively price the orthogonal national systematic risk, while the 
firms that have been fully privatised (FULPRI) do so negatively. As a contrast, the firms that 
are still partly owned by the state, e.g., BOTQUAR, MIDQUAR and UPPQUAR, do not 
price the orthogonal national systematic risk, possibly because these firms have no incentive 
to price the national market risk in view of the government’s guarantee on their finance. It 
seems that the Chinese stock market is more evidently integrated with the global market in 
this sub-period pre-April 2004. The estimates of Eq. (4’) also suggest a strong influence of 
the global risk factor on the pricing of the portfolios in this sub-period. The strongest 
exposure to the orthogonal global risk factor is identified by the Wald tests to be FULPRI, 
consistent with the graphical observation in section 5.1 that FULPRI is the most sensitive to 
the global market excess return. In line with the theory of risk aversion that investment in the 
most risky or sensitive stock is rewarded most highly, the investors of the fully-privatised 
firms pay the highest premium to hedge against the global downturns.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The coefficients of Dit (1−βtG ) and Dit (1−βtN )  in Eqs. (4) and (4’), ciγ0 and ciδ0, must be negative for the 
changes in the prices of the unorthogonal risks to be positive.	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The break point at May 2004 has impacted the exposures almost consistently across 
portfolios. Specifically, the exposure to the orthogonal national systematic risk increases in 
all portfolios except ZERO and there is no change to the exposure to the orthogonal global 
systematic risk in all but UPPQUAR in the sub-period following May 2004. Consequently, 
the null hypotheses of integration and segmentation can be rejected, respectively, in favour of 
positive exposures to the orthogonal national and global risks across all portfolios, including 
those of the shares of the partly-privatised firms. Given the positive pricing of both the global 
and national systematic risks by all of the portfolios in the sub-period following May 2004, 
the Chinese stock market is partially integrated with the global market, consistent with the 
result of the panel data regression in the same sub-period. The measures for improving 
corporate governance since May 2004 may have cancelled out the effect of the government’s 
financial guarantee for the partly-privatised firms, prompting these firms to expose 
additionally to the national systematic risk. Similar to the impacts of the break point of 
February 2009 observed in the panel data regression, the exposures to both the orthogonal 
national and global systematic risks have decreased in all portfolios since July 2008 or 
February 2009. Consequently, there is no evidence of complete or partial integration in the 
third sub-period. In the case of ZERO, furthermore, neither the null hypothesis of integration 
nor that of segmentation is rejected, leading to contradictory results between Eqs. (4) and 
(4’). In the case of MIDQUAR, market segmentation is confirmed in both Eqs. (4) and (4’).  
Overall, the results of Eq. (4’) in Table 5 are mostly consistent with those reported in Table 3, 
supporting our expectation that the hypothesis of segmentation is rejected in the Chinese 
stock market due to China’s strong trade links with the rest of the world. The Chinese 
portfolios have consistently priced the orthogonal global risk more highly than the orthogonal 
national risk. The estimates of Eq. (4) in Table 5, on the other hand, suggest different pricing 
of the national systematic risk between partly- and fully-privatised firms over the sub-
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periods. Negative pricing of the systematic risks is confined to the sub-period post-July 2008 
or February 2009 when the world economy went into recession. It seems that investors are 
not rewarded for risk taking in any of the Chinese stocks during the economic recession.  
5.2.2 when structural changes are endogenously controlled for  
In this section, we use the Markov two-state regime-switching approach to characterise the 
potential structural breaks in Eqs. (3) and (3’) as a consequence of occasional transition 
between two regimes, a high-volatility state and a low-volatility state as in Eqs. (5) and (5’). 
The estimated results of Eqs. (5) and (5’) for the period of July 2001 to December 2011 are 
reported in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. The regimes can be distinguished by the standard 
deviations of the regression residuals, . According to these volatility measures on Tables 6 
and 7, regimes 1 and 2 are the low-volatility and high-volatility states respectively. There is 
noticeable persistence in both states for all the portfolios since the probabilities of staying in 
the existing states, P(1,1) and 1-P(1,2), are high. The persistence in both states results in the 
formation of the regimes in blocks over time as shown in Figure 4, where we plot the 
smoothed probabilities of volatility regimes generated by the recursive representation Eq. (6) 
of Gray (1996) for Eqs. (5) and (5’). Consistent with Figure 4, furthermore, the regime 
classification measure (RCM) takes values close to its lower limit, suggesting that our 
estimated two-state regime-switching model is able to distinctly classify the two alternative 
modes of behaviour for the Chinese portfolios. Although the portfolios hardly switch regimes 
at the most common break point of May 2004 as identified by the Bai-Perron algorithm 
(2003), most of the Chinese portfolios change their behaviour considerably at the break point 
of July 2008 or February 2009 by switching their states. It is not surprising that the economic 
recession period following the end of the recent global financial crisis is categorised as a 
high-volatility period in the Chinese data by the Markov regime-switching technique, given 
ts
σ
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that the market value-weighted average share prices do appear to be more volatile in the 
period post-March 2009 than the period pre-August 2007 in Figure 2. 
[Tables 6 and 7 are about here.]  
[Figure 4 is about here.] 
Using the two-state regime-switching technique, we firstly observe distinct risk prices across 
portfolios, as reported in Tables 6 and 7. In the case of BOTQUAR, the null hypothesis of 
integration (γ21 = 0 or γ22 = 0 ) cannot be rejected in either low- or high-volatility periods, 
while the null hypotheses of segmentation (δ21 = 0 and δ22 = 0 ) are rejected in both periods. 
These results support the conclusion from Table 3 that the firms that fall in the bottom 
quartile of residual state ownership distribution are fully integrated with the global market in 
the whole sample period. In the cases of ZERO and UPPQUAR, on the other hand, the null 
hypothesis of integration is rejected in favour of negative pricing of the orthogonal national 
systematic risk (γ21 < 0  andγ22 < 0 ) in both low- and high-volatility periods. Note that 
Figure 4 shows that, in the case of UPPQUAR, the high-volatility period overlaps with the 
majority of the sub-period since July 2008. During this overlapped period, UPPQUAR 
negatively prices the national systematic risk, as detected by both the dummy variable 
approach and the regime-switching approach.  
The remaining two portfolios’ distinct risk prices in the low- and high-volatility periods 
appear to suggest that the Chinese stock market strengthens its integration with the global 
market in the high-volatility periods. For example, in the case of FULPRI, the null hypothesis 
of integration (in Table 6) is rejected in favour of positive exposure to the orthogonal national 
systematic risk in the low-volatility periods. But in the high-volatility periods, the null 
hypothesis of integration	   is not rejected, leaving the global systematic risk as the only 
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determinant in the pricing of FULPRI. Although it negatively prices the orthogonal national 
systematic risk in the low-volatility periods, MIDQUAR does not expose to the orthogonal 
national systematic risk in the high-volatility periods. Given that the null hypothesis of 
segmentation (in Table 7) is rejected additionally, FULPRI and MIDQUAR are fully 
integrated with the global market in the high-volatility periods. However, in both cases, part 
of their high-volatility regimes overlaps the recent global financial crisis during August 2007 
and March 2009. It is likely that the stronger integration with the global market has arisen 
from an increased propensity to hedge the global risk in the crisis, as suggested by 
Vermeulen (2013).  
Overall, the international influence on the Chinese asset pricing is stronger in the high-
volatility periods than in the low-volatility periods. Across portfolios, the Wald tests confirm 
that FULPRI and BOTQUAR price the orthogonal global systematic risk equally most highly 
in the high-volatility periods. However, the fully-privatised firms expose to the national 
systematic risk additionally, while the firms that fall in the bottom quartile of the residual 
state ownership distribution do not. Hence, the fully-privatised firms are no more integrated 
with the global market than the partly-privatised firms. Given that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of integration for BOTQUAR in any of the periods and for MIDQUAR only in the 
high-volatility periods, while rejecting it for UPPQUAR in all periods, we can conclude that 
the strength of integration with the global market is inversely related to the extent of residual 
state ownership among the partly-privatised firms. In the line of Ng et al. (2009), our results 
suggest that political support and connections through state ownership may be necessary for 
emerging economies to achieve integration with the global market. 
6. Conclusions 
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This paper investigates the risk pricing by portfolios across China’s state ownership 
distribution within the well-developed CAPM framework. The unique portfolios we compiled 
capture the institutional characteristics better and are therefore more appropriate for studies 
on asset pricing of emerging stock markets. Firstly, through anchoring our analysis to the 
unique portfolios, we successfully control for the potential risks, such as political interference 
and liquidity, associated with state ownership in the two-beta asset-pricing model and obtain 
empirical results that are mostly consistent with the theory of risk aversion, as opposed to the 
negative risk pricing often reported in the literature on emerging markets. Secondly, by 
contrasting pricing of the national and global systematic risks between the fully- and partly-
privatised firms and among the partly-privatised firms, we deduce a non-linear relationship 
between stock market integration and state ownership that is missing in the literature but is 
needed for the policy-making purposes.  
We find that complete privatisation does not eliminate exposure to the national systematic 
risk. It is the firms in the bottom quartile of the state ownership distribution that are most 
likely not to price the national systematic risk. Within the partly-privatised firms, China’s 
integration with the global stock market strengthens as residual state ownership decreases. 
These results suggest that emerging economies should pursue rigorous privatisation and yet 
their governments keep small stakes in privatised firms in order to ensure integration with the 
global market. In line with Ng et al. (2009), political support and business connections 
through state ownership may be necessary for achieving integration between emerging and 
global stock markets. However, from the experiences of developed economies, transparency 
with appropriate monitoring is the sufficient condition for firm performance, pointing to the 
need of research on stock market integration in relations to corporate governance in emerging 
economies.  
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Table 1 Summary statistics of the excess returns during 2000.1-2011.12 
 Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation 
ZERO -2.71 29.07 -35.45 9.84 
FULPRI -2.42 24.71 -41.35 9.46 
BOTQUAR -2.68 33.32 -36.63 10.45 
MIDQUAR -2.69 27.25 -27.29 10.16 
UPPQUAR -2.32 25.84 -39.21 9.72 
NATIONAL -2.13 20.95 -32.30 8.61 
GLOBAL -0.24 17.42 -17.81 5.51 
CN rf rate 2.51 4.14 1.98 0.64 
US rf rate 0.19 0.56 0 0.17 
 
Note: ZERO = portfolio of stocks of firms that have never been state owned 
          FULPRI = portfolio of stocks of firms that have been fully privatised stocks 
          BOTQUAR = portfolio of stocks of firms falling in the bottom quartile of the state 
ownership distribution 
          MIDQUAR = portfolios of stock of firms falling in the middle 25% of the state 
ownership distribution  
          UPPQUAR = portfolio of stocks of firms falling in the upper quartile of the state 
ownership distribution  
          NATIONAL = the Chinese A-share market index 
          GLOBAL = MSCI all country index 
          CN rf rate = the Chinese risk-free rate of return 
          US rf rate = the US risk-free rate of return 
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Table 2 Estimates of Eqs. (2) and (2’) by OLS during 2000.1-2011.12  
	   Eq.	  (2)	   Eq.(2’)	   	  
µ	   βG	   βN-­‐G	   χ2	  	  
(βN-­‐G=0)	  	  
µ	   βN	   βG-­‐N	   χ2	 
(βG-­‐N=0)	  
ZERO	   -2.693*** 
(0.803) 
0.071 
(0.146) 
0.271*** 
(0.096) 
7.967*** 
 
-2.141** 
(0.827) 
0.267*** 
(0.094) 
-0.025 
(0.150) 
0.029 
FULPRI	   -2.373*** 
(0.778) 
0.185 
(0.142) 
0.196** 
(0.093) 
4.442*** -1.964** 
(0.801) 
0.213** 
(0.091) 
0.115 
(0.145) 
0.630 
BOTQUAR	   -2.648*** 
(0.859) 
0.125 
(0.156) 
0.242** 
(0.103) 
5,542*** -2.151** 
(0.884) 
0.247** 
(0.100) 
0.039 
(0.161) 
0.058 
MIDQUAR	   -2.668*** 
(0.835) 
0.079 
(0.152) 
0.248** 
(0.100) 
6.192*** 
 
-2.161** 
(0.859) 
0.247** 
(0.100) 
-0.010 
(0.156) 
0.004 
 
UPPQUAR	   -2.286*** 
(0.792) 
0.157 
(0.144) 
0.263*** 
(0.095) 
7.682*** 
 
-1.745** 
(0.816) 
0.272*** 
(0.093) 
0.063 
(0.148) 
0.182 
 
Note: This table reports estimates of equations: 
(2) where GtNttGN RR 356.0043.2)( −+=−ω  
                                                                                            s.e.                     (0.702)    (0.128) 
and 
 
(2’)  where NtGttNG RR 146.0072.0)( −−=−ω  
                                                                                            s. e.                      (0.462)     (0.052)       
 
The heteroscedasticity-consistent (Eicker-White) standard errors are in brackets.  
*, ** and *** represent levels of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
The χ2 critical value is 2.706 at one degree of freedom and 10% level of significance. 
 
 
 
  
ttGN
GN
Gt
G
t eRR +++= −
−
)(ωββµ
ttNG
NG
Nt
N
t eRR +++= −
−
)(ωββµ
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Table 3 Estimates of Eqs. (3) and (3’) by OLS during 2001.7-2011.12  
	   Eq.(3)	   Eq.	  (3’)	  
γ0	   γ2	   χ2	  (γ2=0)	  	   δ0	   δ2	   χ2	 (δ2=0)	 
PANEL	   -4.040*** 
(0.229) 
0.360* 
(0.198) 
3.284* -1.840*** 
(0.230) 
0.563*** 
(0.149) 
14.22*** 
ZERO	   -3.553*** 
(0.069) 
-0.518** 
(0.279) 
6.432** 
 
-3.759*** 
(0.069) 
1.247* 
(0.709) 
3.095* 
FULPRI	   -3.937*** 
(0.061) 
1.589*** 
(0.142) 
32.48*** -3.829*** 
(0.049) 
4.663*** 
(0.318) 
214.89*** 
BOTQUAR	   -3.540*** 
(0.070) 
0.207 
(0.254) 
0.664 -3.557*** 
(0.050) 
2.884*** 
(0.423) 
46.50*** 
MIDQUAR	   -3.968*** 
(0.087) 
1.737*** 
(0.341) 
25.95*** 
 
-3.684*** 
(0.065) 
4.352*** 
(0.705) 
38.14*** 
 
UPPQUAR	   -3.445*** 
(0.056) 
0.903*** 
(0.211) 
18.24*** 
 
-3.308*** 
(0.043) 
3.416*** 
(0.352) 
94.10*** 
 
Note: γ0 and δ0 are, respectively, the coefficients of the unorthogonal global and national 
systematic risks, while γ2 and δ2 are those of the orthogonal national and global systematic 
risks. The estimates for PANEL are from the fixed-effects model of a panel data regression. 
The standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** represent levels of significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. The χ2 critical value is 2.706 at one degree of freedom and 10% level 
of significance. 
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Table 4 The Bai-Perron (2003) multiple change point analysis on Eqs. (3) and (3’) 
Portfolio Eq. (3) Eq. (3’) No. Breaks Time points No. Breaks Time points 
ZERO 3 2004:05   
2007:11     
2009:02     
2 2004:05     
2007:02     
  
FULPRI 3 2003:01 
2004:05 
2008:07 
3 2002:12 
2004:05 
2007:10 
BOTQUAR 2 2004:05     
2009:02     
3 2004:05     
2007:09    
2008:12     
MIDQUAR 3 2004:05    
2007:11        
2009:02     
3 2004:05     
2007:01     
2009:11     
UPPQUAR 4 2002:09 
2005:04 
2007:04 
2008:07    
3 2005:04     
2007:09     
2009:07     
Note: The Bai-Perron algorithm is applied to Eqs. (3) and (3’) in the sample period of July 2001 and 
December 2011. The data points before July 2001 are omitted to avoid the typically unstable or 
extreme estimates of the beta risks in the initialisation period of the Kalman smoothing algorithm in 
Eqs. (2) and (2’). The number of break points is identified by using BIC statistics.  
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Table 5 Estimates of Eqs. (4) and (4’) by OLS and diagnostic tests of the breaks 
	   PANEL ZERO FULPRI BOTQUAR MIDQUAR UPPQUAR 
Eq. (4):	  
γ0 
-2.946*** 
(0.180) 
-3.787*** 
(0.079) 
-4.021*** 
(0.037) 
-3.428*** 
(0.050) 
-3.906*** 
(0.049) 
-3.387*** 
(0.042) 
γ2 
1.113*** 
(0.182) 
0.752*** 
(0.279) 
-0.869*** 
(0.328) 
-0.113 
(0.330) 
-0.099 
(0.323) 
-0.068 
(0.332) 
c1γ0 
-0.305*** 
(0.049) 
-0.482*** 
(0.105) 
-0.147** 
(0.074) 
-0.854*** 
(0.089) 
-0.803*** 
(0.092) 
-0.341*** 
(0.069) 
c1γ2 
0.453** 
(0.194) 
-0.320 
(0.319) 
2.897*** 
(0.405) 
1.464*** 
(0.389) 
2.946*** 
(0.404) 
1.384*** 
(0.378) 
γ0+c1γ0 
-3.252*** 
(0.196) 
-4.270*** 
(0.069) 
-4.169*** 
(0.064) 
-4.282*** 
(0.074) 
-4.709*** 
(0.077) 
-3.729*** 
(0.055) 
γ2+c1γ2 
1.567*** 
(0.157) 
0.432*** 
(0.155) 
2.029*** 
(0.238) 
1.351*** 
(0.205) 
2.847*** 
(0.243) 
1.316*** 
(0.182) 
c2γ0 
1.658*** 
(0.125) 
1.236*** 
(0.151) 
3.002*** 
(0.204) 
4.236*** 
(1.182) 
3.806*** 
(0.765) 
2.998*** 
(0.205) 
c2γ2 
-2.843*** 
(0.499) 
-1.355* 
(0.884) 
-9.861*** 
(0.795) 
-12.37*** 
(4.448) 
-10.39*** 
(3.072) 
-7.977*** 
(0.631) 
γ0+c1γ0+c2γ0 
-1.594*** 
(0.238) 
-3.034*** 
(0.135) 
-1.167** 
(0.194) 
-0.046 
(1.179) 
-0.904 
(0.761) 
-0.731*** 
(0.199) 
γ2+c1γ2+c2γ2 
-1.276*** 
(0.482) 
-0.923 
(0.870) 
-7.832*** 
(0.758) 
-11.02*** 
(4.443) 
-7.538*** 
(3.062) 
-6.662*** 
(0.604) 
χ2 statistic for  
H0: ciγj=0 
857.62*** 251.87*** 343.59*** 284.32*** 450.26*** 253.96*** 
Eq. (4’) 
δ0 
-4.400*** 
(0.117) 
-3.940*** 
(0.103) 
-3.767*** 
(0.050) 
-3.518*** 
(0.138) 
-3.891*** 
(0.118) 
-3.368*** 
(0.040) 
δ2 
3.006*** 
(0.348) 
1.344** 
(0.738) 
6.726*** 
(0.459) 
2.625*** 
(0.860) 
4.072*** 
(1.162) 
3.743*** 
(0.466) 
c1δ0 -0.345*** (0.052) 
-0.449*** 
(0.113) 
-0.399*** 
(0.244) 
-0.531*** 
(0.145) 
-0.284** 
(0.133) 
-0.200*** 
(0.057) 
c1δ2 
-0.648* 
(0.430) 
-0.322 
(0.883) 
-0.627 
(0.569) 
0.257 
(0.982) 
0.962 
(1.298) 
1.242** 
(0.600) 
δ0+c1δ0 
-4.745*** 
(0.130) 
-4.388*** 
(0.047) 
-4.166*** 
(0.051) 
-4.049*** 
(0.046) 
-4.175*** 
(0.062) 
-3.568*** 
(0.040) 
δ2+c1δ2 
2.358*** 
(0.252) 
1.022** 
(0.484) 
6.099*** 
(0.336) 
2.882*** 
(0.474) 
5.035*** 
(0.579) 
4.985*** 
(0.375) 
c2δ0 
1.415*** 
(0.047) 
1.591*** 
(0.068) 
1.910*** 
(0.084) 
1.463*** 
(0.125) 
1.482*** 
(0.095) 
1.396*** 
(0.080) 
c2δ2 
-4.166*** 
(0.470) 
-3.104** 
(1.793) 
-8.580*** 
(0.473) 
-5.841*** 
(1.712) 
-5.853*** 
(1.689) 
-7.234*** 
(0.548) 
δ0+c1δ0+c2δ0 
-3.330*** 
(0.132) 
-2.797*** 
(0.050) 
-2.256*** 
(0.066) 
-2.586*** 
(0.116) 
-2.693*** 
(0.072) 
-2.172*** 
(0.069) 
δ2+c1δ2+c2δ2 
-1.808*** 
(0.461) 
-2.082 
(1.726) 
-2.481*** 
(0.333) 
-2.959** 
(1.645) 
-0.819 
(1.587) 
-2.249*** 
(0.400) 
χ2 statistic for  
H0: ciδj=0 1087.6*** 578.90*** 647.36*** 260.45*** 267.44*** 320.35*** 
Note: The sample period is July 2001 and December 2011. Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * 
represent levels of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively for a one-tailed test. Break point 1 is May 2004 
for all portfolios. Break point 2 is February 2009 for panel regression and for ZERO, BOTQUAR and 
MIDQUAR, while it is July 2008 for FULPRI and UPPQUAR. The degrees of freedom for the joint 
significance tests of the two breaks are four in each case, e.g., c1γ0=c1γ2=c2γ0=c2γ2=0 and c1δ0=c1δ2=c2δ0=c2δ2=0.  
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Table 6 Estimates of Eq. (5) by the Markov two-state regime-switching technique 
 ZERO FULPRI BOTQUAR MIDQUAR UPPQUAR 
γ01 
-2.971*** 
(0.039) 
-3.967*** 
(0.023) 
-2.834*** 
(0.060) 
-2.366*** 
(0.064) 
-2.433*** 
(0.061) 
γ21 
-1.039*** 
(0.089) 
1.321*** 
(0.123) 
-0.154 
(0.236) 
-1.524*** 
(0.191) 
-0.831*** 
(0.163) 
γ02 
-3.754*** 
(0.076) 
-3.756*** 
(0.230) 
-3.694*** 
(0.057) 
-4.043*** 
(0.044) 
-3.412*** 
(0.044) 
γ22 
-1.222*** 
(0.311) 
1.411 
(0.906) 
0.156 
(0.201) 
-0.115 
(0.261) 
-0.437* 
(0.251) 
σ1 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
σ2 
0.075*** 
(0.014) 
0.328*** 
(0.061) 
0.114*** 
(0.017) 
0.076*** 
(0.012) 
0.062*** 
(0.010) 
P(1,1) 0.97*** (0.020) 
0.979*** 
(0.018) 
0.982*** 
(0.022) 
0.972*** 
(0.021) 
0.968*** 
(0.025) 
P(1,2) 0.037* (0.022) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
RCM 3.7588 3.494 1.5638 1.4113 2.6977 
No. iterations 
to achieve 
convergence 
20 15 27 29 41 
Note: The sample period is July 2001 and December 2011.  
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively for a one-tailed test.  
σ1 and σ2 are standard deviations of the regression residuals in regimes 1 and 2 respectively.  
P(i, j) are estimated transition probabilities for switching from regime j to regime i.  
RCM is the regime classification measure, )1(400 1
1
1
1
t
T
t
tT ppRCM −×= ∑
=
, devised by Ang and 
Bekaert (2002) for the case of two states. p1t is the probabilities for regime 1 being in force at 
each point in time. A value of 0 means perfect classification while a value of 100 implies failure to 
classify. 
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Table 7 Estimates of Eq. (5’) by the Markov two-state regime-switching technique  
 ZERO FULPRI BOTQUAR MIDQUAR UPPQUAR 
δ01 
-2.779*** 
(0.034) 
-2.353*** 
(0.054) 
-4.159*** 
(0.044) 
-2.710*** 
(0.026) 
-2.146*** 
(0.052) 
δ21 
0.182 
(1.752) 
-2.581*** 
(0.268) 
2.153*** 
(0.429) 
-1.456*** 
(0.026) 
-2.191*** 
(0.300) 
δ02 
-4.236*** 
(0.040) 
-4.026*** 
(0.028) 
-3.180*** 
(0.040) 
-4.216*** 
(0.046) 
-3.467*** 
(0.028) 
δ22 
0.011*** 
(0.358) 
4.530*** 
(0.227) 
4.490*** 
(0.320) 
2.369*** 
(0.506) 
3.542*** 
(0.305) 
σ1 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.036*** 
(0.009) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
σ2 
0.080*** 
(0.011) 
0.043*** 
(0.007) 
0.063*** 
(0.011) 
0.075*** 
(0.012) 
0.042*** 
(0.007) 
P(1,1) 0.989*** (0.015) 
0.991*** 
(0.012) 
0.945*** 
(0.034) 
0.992*** 
(0.009) 
0.991*** 
(0.011) 
P(1,2) 0.007 (0.008) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
RCM 0.7998 1.756 3.7428 1.0505 1.4160 
No. iterations to 
achieve 
convergence 
20 28 14 22 21 
Note: The sample period is July 2001 and December 2011.  
***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively for a one-tailed test.  
σ1 and σ2 are standard deviations of the regression residuals in regimes 1 and 2 respectively.  
P(i, j) are estimated transition probabilities for switching from regime j to regime i.  
RCM is the regime classification measure, )1(400 1
1
1
1
t
T
t
tT ppRCM −×= ∑
=
, devised by Ang and 
Bekaert (2002) for the case of two states. p1t is the probabilities for regime 1 being in force at 
each point in time. A value of 0 means perfect classification while a value of 100 implies failure to 
classify. 
 
 
  
	   38	  
Figure 1 Average percentages of state ownership for firms falling in the top, middle and 
bottom quartiles of state ownership distribution over 2000-2011 
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Figure 2 Market value-weighted average share prices (in Chinese Yuan) 
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Figure	  3	  Time-­‐varying	  systematic	  risks	  during	  July	  2001	  and	  December	  2011	  
Panel	  A:	  βG	  and	  βN-­‐G	   Panel	  B:	  βN	  and	  βG-­‐N	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
Note: Lines in –x-x-x- represent the unorthogonal global systematic risk (βG in panel A) or orthogonal global 
systematic risk (βG-­‐N in panel B) and those in ⎯ are the orthogonal national systematic risk (βN-­‐G in panel A) or 
unorthogonal national systematic risk (βN in panel B). The systematic risks in panel A are estimated from Eqs. 
(2.2) and (2.3), while those in panel B are estimated from Eqs. (2.2’) and (2.3’) by the Kalman smoothing 
technique. 
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Figure	  4	  Smoothed	  probabilities	  of	  volatility	  regimes	  generated	  by	  the	  recursive	  representation	  of	  Gray	  (1996)	  
Panel	  A:	  Eq.	  (5)	   Panel	  B:	  Eq.(5’)	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Note:	  Shaded	  areas	  represent	  high-­‐volatility	  regimes.	  The	  arrows	  indicate	  the	  major	  break	  points	  identified	  by	  
Bai-­‐Perron	  algorithm	  (2003).	  
